INDIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS AS RELATED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN BANGLADESH AND SYRIA, AND THEIR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPACT

INTRODUCTION
1. Against the run of play in the world of global strategic affairs, the situation in Bangladesh and Syria suddenly erupted in the second half of 2024. Both the nations though seemingly unconnected but in reality, bearing a fair significance to India’s strategic security due to the potential unpredictable flow of events. While Bangladesh is far from the existing areas of geopolitical tension in Ukraine and Gaza, Syria happens to be linked to both by virtue of its geostrategic location.

2. Bangladesh on India’s eastern flank is key to our Look East and Act East policy but the rising tide of Islamist trends and anti-India sentiment within the country, perceptively aided by the official establishment, is worrisome as is a near reversal of India’s strategic achievement, the victory of 1971.

3. Syria on the other hand was quiet for the last five years, although the civil war which began after the Arab Spring of 2011, was festering without manifestation of the turbulent situation witnessed during the heyday of ISIS (Daesh) (2014-18). With a war already raging in Gaza, instability in Syria is potentially complicating an already complex situation.

4. Similarly, Instability in Bangladesh and potential anti-India dispensation does not augur well for the security of India’s vulnerable North East and the eastern and northern borders in general. In the Middle East, Indian interests lie very deep and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has invested much time and energy in establishing excellent geopolitical networks for the future. Gaza and Syria threaten to expand the instability of the region adversely affecting India.

5. Overall Threats: The overall threats emerging from the West and the East are far more complex than those that existed and fall in the category of the unknown. These need clarity in identification along with the potential networks which may exploit the situation arising from the ongoing instability. This is all the more important because of the change in the US leadership with Donald Trump promising several areas of revisit to determine US interests and the strategy to take them forward. It’s important to establish how Indian and US strategic interests will converge in relation to the outcome from the developments in these two countries, and what needs to be done to ensure that.

6. Surya Foundation Think Tank comprising domain experts carried out an in-depth study of “India’s Strategic Interests as Related to Developments in Bangladesh and Syria, and their Regional and Global Impact”.

ISSUES
7. Keeping the overall complex threats emerging from the East and West, the subject related to the altered strategic environment as exemplified by the events in Bangladesh and Syria, the Think Tank deliberated upon the various issues with special reference to the following:-

a) The Global impact.
b) The Regional impact related to the Middle East and South Asia.
c) The effect of the above change on India’s Geopolitical interests.
d) Recommendations on how India should approach the two issues to optimize the outcome

BANGLADESH
8. Discussion on Bangladesh covered issues ranging from political to economic, ideological, military and psychological, with the overall impact on the regional strategic environment.
9. Situational Developments. Focus of developments in Bangladesh covered aspects on repercussions and countermeasures rather than the causes of the downturn for India’s security. These have been amplified as under:-
a) A broad consensus that the external hand responsible for the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina was that of the US.

b) A mistaken notion appears to have existed in the Biden administration that Sheikh Hasina’s overthrow would turn Bangladesh in favour of the US, away from the inclination it was showing towards China. The advent of Islamic radicals was acceptable to the US as a lesser evil.

c) The anti-India sentiment is high and visible in the streets, in social media and in the political discourse. Yet, all is not lost as the Awami League is only temporarily in deep freeze. This can change with the adoption of the right counter strategy to overcome the meltdown.

d) The Indian stance has been correct and the quiet diplomacy is ensuring that India is not provoking; the right policy under the circumstances.

e) There is an intense rise in radicalism in Bangladesh with an increase in the significance of the Jamat e Islami (JI). The Bangladesh National Party (BNP) which has ruled Bangladesh before is in a tactical league with JI to garner advantage. This is not a permanent fusion or arrangement. Radicalism on the streets and the anti-India and anti-Hindu sentiment is being stoked to retain the significance of these opposition elements, especially the students and youth in general.

f) The intellectual community does not have an anti-India perception. It’s just that it feels that India has not appreciated the sentiment of the common people of Bangladesh who pine for true democracy which Sheikh Hasina could never deliver.

g) The Pakistan hand is increasing in the affairs of Bangladesh. Most feel that Pakistan never left Bangladesh; it remained embedded there to ensure that it could seek opportunity for retribution against India and exploit India’s eastern vulnerability. The visiting ISI delegation and the much-hyped visit of the Bangladesh Army delegation to Rawalpindi are being projected out of proportion to raise India’s hackles and create a psychological impact. Pakistan’s intent is to undo 1971.

h) Why did the US choose to take Pakistan on board to bring about a meltdown in Bangladesh? The coming of the Trump Administration 2.0 found favour amongst discussants in terms of working towards reversing the earlier US strategy.

i) The Indian media needs to temper itself to play to our identified strategic interests instead of being provocative to play to India’s street sentiment.

j) The current government in Dhaka is illegal and has no locus standi to demand repatriation of Sheikh Hasina.

k) Economically, Bangladesh is already feeling the pinch with a downturn in exports of clothing and apparel, with a large number of workers laid off and a full negative impact on growth. Forex also has come down to a low of $15 billion.

l) China has thus far not expressed any overt sentiment but its hand appears to be steering the Pakistan strategy to create the perception of a ‘Third Front’ for India. The vulnerability of the Siliguri corridor and the resistance by the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) towards the continuation of the construction of the anti-infiltration fence are areas of immediate concern in the border security domain.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION BY INDIA
10. Based upon the evolving situation comprehensively covered above, India must proactively be seized of the necessity to act quickly and without provocation. It has done remarkably well so far but further clarity in the strategy would help the government.

• For starters India must be in touch with the State Department of Trump 2.0 to trigger a potential change in US policy towards Bangladesh to counter the rise of Islamic radicalism and ensure the early return of democracy.

• A possible asylum arrangement in the US for Sheikh Hasina should be sought.

• The Indian strategic community must wargame the situation in Bangladesh and determine the best options which can then be diplomatically executed. It’s a complex situation which needs extraordinary considerations and analyses.

• We must not lose contact with the Awami League because in a crisis it's important to be seen to be with it. Its return in due course is inevitable knowing the nature of Bangladesh politics.

• In spite of the above we should be willing and ready to work with any government which the people elect to power.

• The real danger is the rising tide of Islamic radicalism. A fuller analysis of this is needed. The Government can set up a discussion with Nationalist clergy to obtain ideas on the way forward.

• Social media campaigns have to be professionally played out by a single body entrusted with the responsibility. This is a wonderful test case for establishing social media credentials in the strategic sphere. Entrusted in wrong hands this can lead to negative outcomes.

• The people of Bangladesh have to be softly conveyed that their future interest lies in good and healthy relations with a country such as India, which is respected universally, has a strong economic order which remains in support of the regional order and that the two nations can together ensure a surge in our joint future. A majority of the Bangladesh people are still presumed to be pro-India.

• The importance of securing the interests of the minorities in Bangladesh cannot be underplayed. The people of India expect the Government to be proactive about this. Mohummad Yunus is shedding tears for some youth killed in the violent protests around 5 Aug 2024. Our intent should be to make him also shed tears for the minorities who were killed in the aftermath of the violence, for no fault of theirs.

• The BSF is correctly remaining in close touch with the BGB. We need not push too hard on the fencing issue while sentiments are still raw in Bangladesh but this should not be the final status of the fence either.

• As Bangladesh’s economy tanks further, which it is bound to, we need to debate the virtues of rendering any assistance, especially in material terms such as food and fuel. This should not be taken for granted and must be linked to other diplomatic gains which the Government can determine. We should be mindful of the large quantum of remittances coming into Bangladesh from its huge diaspora abroad; it amounts to 23 billion $US`

• By itself Bangladesh is not a military threat to India. However, in league with other nations it can be. We need to treat it as a friend and not as an adversary. The larger meaning of this approach needs to be evolved from all angles.

• Most importantly, it is felt that in the absence of direct workable contacts with the current government in Dhaka it is best to look at the prevailing goodwill rather than the negativity. A Track 2 process with different domains – political, economic, diplomatic and military (and even ideological) could be set up on an experimental basis with assistance of many in India who have experienced the same with Pakistan. The same should not be judged from the angle of outcomes but rather from that of the communication which would remain open.

SYRIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
11. As a nation which has traditionally always supported India, Syria is seen through a positive prism by policy makers in India. Its geostrategic location gives it considerable significance, occupying a prominent part of the Levant with an ancient civilization. For the last fifty years a politically secular government has been leading a diverse population. Mostly Syria has aligned with Iran after its cleavage with Egypt several years ago. The Alawite element to which former President Bashir Assad belongs is a subset of Shia Islam and hence this affinity has proved to the strength of the Russia-Iran alignment in the Middle East.

12. The Hayat Tehrir al Shams (HTS) which has captured power in Syria by overthrowing the Assad regime appears to have had agreements with the Russians, the US and Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan acknowledged cooperation with HTS during his tenure as the head of Turkey's National Intelligence Organization stating that HTS provided Turkey with information on members of ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Situational Developments
13. The situation in the region post the fall of the Assad regime is as follows:-

a) Violence subsided very early after HTS takeover. Commander-in-Chief of the new administration, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has appointed Mohammed al-Bashir to lead a caretaker government until 01 March 2025.

b) The Russian-Iran axis is the loser with retention of no influence in Damascus although Russia continues to maintain its naval and air force presence at Latakia and Khmeimim.

c) A counter revolution by Assad is very unlikely due to the overall breakdown of the old order in Syria and the Syrian Army having melted down due to corruption.

d) Syria, under the new dispensation, has indicated a renewed and evolving relationship with the Arab League, with ongoing diplomatic engagements aimed at addressing regional concerns and supporting Syria's reintegration into the Arab community. This has offset it to considerable extent from Iran and the Russia-Iran alignment finds itself at great strategic disadvantage. e) The US has removed a $10 million bounty on HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa.

f) A six-month sanctions exemption has been given by the US for transactions with Syrian governing institutions to facilitate humanitarian aid.

g) The U.S. approach on Syria is to engage with the new leadership, focusing on diplomatic relations, humanitarian assistance, and regional stability. The US is also working to find a solution to the perennial problem of the Kurds who live in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran.

h) Ideologically HTS is Sunni but an automatic linkage with Saudi Arabia does not exist. There is cautious engagement which is currently on. i) The above are interesting developments related mainly to Syria itself. Peripherally there are other linked interests.

j) The Kurds' issues remain far too complex cutting across four nations. These are likely to remain unaddressed to avoid any side effects and unintended impact.

k) Israel has taken advantage of the situation to push into the Golan Heights and occupy strategically important areas. The Levant is a virtual no-go for transportation of military wherewithal to the proxies in Lebanon or Syria, where Iranian interests continue.

l) Israel has bombed the chemical weapon storage sites and other missile storage facilities in the wake of the meltdown of the Syrian Army. Level of destruction is not known.

m) The prominent proxies of Iran in the Levant have all been marginalized. Resurgence is unlikely in the near future as Iran itself is weakened.

n) With its linkages to the proxies broken Iran is not in a position to extend assistance to either Hamas or Hezbollah. Its linkages with the Houthis of Yemen do remain intact.

o) Many articles by Iranian intellectuals in western media appear to indicate an outreach through which Iran may be willing to renegotiate on its nuclear capability development. The world awaits Trump 2.0 decisions.

Recommendations For Action By India
12. These are as under:-
• India has several interests in the Middle East and a situation of peace and stability only promotes better relationships with individual players in the region, besides creating strategic goodwill. The current Indian Government has gone the extra mile and established a network of goodwill around the Middle East cutting across barriers. It is important that this is retained while ensuring the interests of the diaspora and our economic interests too.

• We need to be equi-distant with Iran and Saudi Arabia to retain our goodwill while remaining engaged with both.

• We need to continue maintaining the stance of condemning all acts of terror and also infringement of human rights. The choice of words, frequency of saying it and the forum where these are mentioned need to be calibrated lest, we fall foul of players in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

• We could be seen to be active on the Humanitarian Assistance front with Palestinians in Gaza and simultaneously maintain high level contact and visits to Israel cementing a special relationship.

• For Syria we could send a delegation to establish an outreach without any expectations. Humanitarian assistance would always be welcomed by Syria. We could also help with a slight surge in medical visas.

• Our relationship with Turkey remains low key but we need to turn that around with intent to ensure Turkey feels compelled to side with India on J&K.

• India needs to see how Trump 2.0 handles the Middle East. Anything which promotes stability and scope for successful establishment of the India - Middle East – Europe Corridor (IMEC) should be backed.

• While addressing the HTS in Syria care needs to be taken to ensure that we do not disturb the interests of any of the numerous stakeholders, including Iran-Russia on one hand, and the US-Saudi-Israel on the other.

• Abraham Accords can be helpful if established with equitable and mutual respect and not out of strategic compulsion. We need to back it when called upon to do so.

• Any emergence of terrorist activity linked to groups such as ISIS militates against India’s interests.

• We should continue backing moderate regimes such as those in Egypt and Jordan.

CONCLUSION
13. The ceasefire in Gaza and the Lebanon front has provided a window for normalization of relationships and rebuilding some trust. It's a short phase in which Palestinian resistance is unlikely to relent from the path of violent confrontation. Prevention of the use of violence should be the aim while ensuring that India’s East and West are both adequately secure.