MANAGING INDIA’S GEOPOLITICAL SUCCESS STORY IN THE EMERGING POST-PANDEMIC WORLD ORDER

Introduction
1. Amidst the gloomy picture of the post pandemic world is the apparently shiny vista of India. The pandemic and the various dynamics of its geopolitical management has left much of the world perplexed while attempting a struggling come back. India, should have been on the mat with huge numbers affected by the pandemic and an economic impact which left its economic growth in the negative for two years. It is now at 6.2 % making it the fastest growing economy in the world. The economic turnaround through effective handling of the economy and the positive spiral brought about by India’s pharma success story has given it a leg up. 2. Alongside is the growing strategic confidence of India whose leadership is often consulted by big powers for the management of world affairs. The Chairmanship of G20 and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have fallen to India’s lot. This too has given a hype to India’s international and regional stature. In addition, is the growing stature of India’s large diaspora which is contributing no less to the positive image of its capability and a positive projection of the Indian people. While all this provides the adrenaline for self-perception and boosting national confidence, none of it is permanent.

3. We have difficult geopolitical challenges to overcome and the choice of going with one nation / bloc or the other in the emerging world multipolarity is fraught with danger. India is thus far maintaining neutrality and yet being counted. Its leadership has been subtle and balanced in the outreach of its projection. With the spectre of challenges coming from China, remaining alone may for India not be a choice at all. There is also the whole issue of internal stability which currently is not such a problem but could become a future challenge if the societal fabric is disturbed.

4. There is a school of thought that there is a tendency on the part of India to move a little faster towards new threats at the cost of the old. The assumption that India could play the role of a swing state in maintaining balance in the emerging world order is perhaps ascribing a role it is yet to fully comprehend and work its options through.

5. Can a potentially more significant geopolitical role for India sustain or is it a flash in the pan because of the economic growth that India is experiencing? Is geopolitical labelling in sync with reality and are old threats giving way to new ones which need better identification and analysis?

OBSERVATIONS AND CHALLENGES
General Observations on India’s Perceived Rise
6. In recent years among all nations of the world it is India which has displayed a high propensity for a rise in geopolitical and strategic significance. Amidst the gloomy picture of the post pandemic world is the apparent shiny vista presented by India. A nation tasting progressive success and then being catapulted to heights has to understand the nuances of power play, an inevitable phenomenon which determines the role that the nation will play in the major aspects of international geopolitics. It has also to anticipate and comprehend the obstacles in its path to achieve higher status it aims at.

7. India’s international and regional status has received an impetus after the successful handling of the pandemic, the economic bounce back which has given hope of reaching the target of a 5 trillion US$ economy in the near future. The quantum of India’s forex, at 550 bn $ gives a basic confidence. Yet the economy needs to become more resilient for a guaranteed surge in national wealth to achieve the worth of 10 trillion US$ by 2035, and geopolitics have to be managed to tailor to this envisaged economic milestone. Conflicts have a nasty way of setting back things in the path of economic growth. The combined weight of China and Pakistan postured against India has a ‘bog down’ effect on our progress; the feasibility of conflict is high due to competing interests. Ways have to be found towards smart and effective adversary management.

8. A basic assumption is that India will inevitably rise but the obstacles in the way need identification and removal to allow a sustained ‘step up’ in an early time frame. While every patriot will applaud the rise of the nation it is also in our interest to get a reality check on various nuances which make up the rise. We could then recalibrate if necessary or reinforce the line.

The Challenges
9. With the spectre of challenges coming from China, remaining alone may for India not be a choice at all, especially after the commencement of the standoff with China since Apr 2020. There is also the whole issue of internal stability which currently is not such a problem but could become a future challenge if the societal fabric is disturbed.

10. The assumption that India could play the role of a swing state in maintaining balance in the emerging world order is perhaps also dawning. The challenge here is to fully comprehend and work our options through. Our place at the geopolitical high table is obviously a result of the appreciated capability. We have to learn to live up to it. Ways have to be found towards smart and effective adversary management as the subcontinent is beset with nations and organizations arraigned against India.

Economic Spinoffs
11. There is no doubt that Indian economy will be the deciding factor about the level and pace of India’s geopolitical rise. The economy needs to become more resilient for a guaranteed surge in national wealth to achieve the worth of 10 trillion US$ by 2035, and geopolitics have to be managed to tailor to this envisaged economic milestone.

12. Conflicts have a nasty way of setting back things in the path of economic growth. The combined weight of China and Pakistan postured against India has a ‘bog down’ effect on our progress. As already brought out adversary management has to be given higher priority. Just like China waited 25 years after 1978, before it flexed the first muscle India has to demonstrate ‘strategic patience’ until its capability is enhanced manifold.

13. A surge in India’s economic growth would need to be powered by increased contribution of manufacturing in the economy; a service-oriented economy has its limitations. A concept of conflict avoidance needs to be adopted through ‘Dissuasive Strategy’ until the attainment of threshold acceptable levels of economic growth and military capability which are perceived as adequate for India’s aspirational needs. In all this the importance of the development of a military industrial complex to ensure full implementation of Atmanirbharta (Self Reliance) would be mandatory.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Dealing with China
14. The level of mutual understanding of each other’s compulsions in the Sino-Indian context is extremely poor. The promotion of Chinese studies in our knowledge institutions needs a fillip. The next steps beyond the China Study Group be thought of. The number of Sinologists in India needs to increase manifold. More than anything it is the lack of trust which dictates China’s behaviour. It remains unconvinced about India’s intention towards delivery of progress to its people.

15. India’s border infrastructure expansion has given China cause for concern because this is something we neglected in the past. The current alarming rate of our infrastructure development could be tempered in projection rather than allow it to become cause for conflict. Visit to each other’s border areas and a little more transparency could contribute towards allaying mistrust.

16. Nations which trade with each other usually do not get into conflict situations with each other. The volume of Sino-India trade for 2022 has climbed to 135.98 billion US$, overtaking the 125 billion US$ mark a yearearlier. China’s exports to India climbed to 118.5 billion US$, a year-on-yearincrease of 21.7 per cent. However, Sino Indian tension at the Line ofActual Control (LAC) continues because of China’s intent to use theLAC for its wolf warrior tactics. The latest Chinese ploy is to detach therelationship from what is happening at the border, i.e., business as usualdespite the border tension. India’s acceptance of this will be tantamountto agreeing on the principle that talks and terror can go hand in handagainst Pakistan.

17. During 2022, China’s imports from India dwindled to USD 17.48 billion,a year-on-year decline of 37.9 per cent. India’s aspirations for big powerstatus have to be matched by its economy being powered by manufacturingcapability to a higher degree. Foreign direct investment, a robust policy onstart-ups with full support accorded to them and induction of technology, arethe means in which India will have to seriously delve in the near future. Ajoint Sino Indian trade and commerce research body needs to lay outwaypoints for a achieving higher quantum of trade which is muchmore balanced.

18. In the military domain it is clear that China enjoys a qualitative asymmetry in its favour. An Indian prioritization and change of strategy should be the management of the border which must be handed over to the Indian Army, the organization best equipped to handle it. All other forces must be placed under its command for optimization of resources. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) must assume responsibility for the border from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) just like the LoC where all forces function under the Army. Contentious borders must remain the purview of the MoD.

Pakistan and the Neighbourhood
19. Strategically except for conniving with China for a forcemultiplication effect Pakistan’s conventional worth is low although itties down a sizeable number of Indian forces in the West. India must notfall for any premature ruses to draw it into limited conflict with a Chineseprovocation. J&K has been managed well except for an odd one-off incident the like of which will probably continue. Politically it cannot be dismissed since even elections have yet to be held after change of constitutional status.It is difficult to explain to the public that for every terror strike Balakotetype attack may not be feasible. Nothing prevents India from extendingextensive deniable covert operations in Pakistan and its areas of interest.That is why non-military options are the best.

Neighbourhood
20. For the neighbourhood no relationships can be taken for granted;each has to be uniquely structured. The promotion of democracy and welfare assistance through medical diplomacy are important factors but thepolitical diversity of nations will need to be respected almost as a rule set inconcrete. Our engagement with the region should be focused onnon-traditional security issues. No nation can be singled out for itsimportance since all of them play a significant part in India’s security.Options to South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)exist in the form of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technicaland Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and their worth must remain infocus.

Relations with the US
21. There is a field of thought that relations with the US have matured through a process of almost 20 years and the exceptional attention being received from the US augurs well for India’s strategic significance and role.

22. In the light of the recent opinion expressed by the Chair for Strategic Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that India may not prove to be a reliable partner of the US when it comes to the Indo Pacific, India must continue respecting its own interests and not fall prey to propagandist views. With that approach India must also realize that it is a part of the international community and will therefore have to many times compromise and promote mutual rather than just self interest. Growing under the radar, without causing consternation is the acme of emergence of big powers. This is what India has to master. China’s discomfort with the US is worldwide and comprehensive but in sheer This is an issue India should avoid getting involved with till as long as possible.

23. An Indo-US progression of partnership appears inevitable and we need to understand that US democratic freedom will always give great scope for critique. We have been extremely sensitive of US-Pak relations but with the growing status these linkages will need to be ignored in order to retain partners and friends.

Relations with Europe
24. Although Europe largely follows a China appeasement policy it should be clear to us that India will follow an India centric policy. Balancing India-US-Europe will remain a challenge but we should build on our relationships with France, Germany and the UK; the latter does act awkward at times and against Indian interests but the bonds with that nation are deeper than what many may realize in India.

The Middle East
25. In the last ten years if there is any region with whom India’s relationship has been transformational it is the Middle East. Indian interests have been promoted in the medium and long term. In order to progress to higher geopolitical status India will need the support of the Gulf nations, particularly Saudi Arabia and UAE. There is positive development with the US also involving itself here and pursuing strategic groupings such as the Western Quad or I2U2 (India-Israel - UAE-US). By expanding its partnerships, the US is attempting to control narratives in all areas of interest. By partnering the US regionally too the benefits also travel to India. This is one area demanding a Special Envoy from the Indian diplomatic community as the domains of concern are many – energy, trade routes, diaspora and ideological connections, being a few. An extended outreach must also be made to all non - Gulf

Cooperation Council (GCC) countries too.
26. This is one region in which India can attempt to be a mediator in disputes and progressively learn to handle these. China has stepped into the Iran-Saudi dispute and has brought a ceasefire in Yemen. India with its proximity to the Gulf, a better understanding of Islamic culture and the existence of a large diaspora, NEEDS TO GRAB INITIATIVES aimed at higher diplomacy.

27. On Iran it may appear that India has lost the plot due to the proactivity of Chinese diplomacy. India’s access to Central Asian Republics (CARs) through Chahbahar is not a closed chapter as some may imagine. What the Iranians would definitely want is an Indian policy without the US baggage, to give weight to an Indo-Iran ‘Civilizational Relationship’. 28. It is reputed that most Middle East nations are close to India but are unclear what India wants from the relationships. Is it better trade, energy security, knowledge exchange, investments or freedom of passage for its shipping. More diplomatic interaction and think tank exchange will provide answers.

Russia and the Ukraine War
29. Although India has maintained a neutrality in the Ukraine war there is no doubt that its discomfort with the Russian stance in the Ukraine war is now increasing. Energy prices through Russia may be in its favour but by and large India’s continued neutrality is being viewed more as a bias towards Russia. The effect of that on Indo-US relations will soon need to be assessed. Perhaps the neutrality should be followed up with initiatives to end the war. Prime Minister Narendra Modi made an international impact with his succinct advice to President Putin on the side lines of SCO summit 2022. This could be followed up by specific proposals and some shuttle diplomacy.

30. Russia is against the Quad as the latter targets China. As a virtual junior partner of China for some years Russia is unlikely to be supportive of India or do much to improve Sino Indian relations. However, India will be constrained to maintain a good relationship with Russia for the sake of the operational efficiency of its Armed Forces until Atmanirbharta achieves much more and offers realistic options for weapons and equipment.

The Indo Pacific Region
31. Any aspiring nation that ignores a whole continent such as Africa needs a rethink of strategy. India has not ignored Africa; in fact, during the nonalignment period, it gave much substance to the developing world with special favours to many African nations. Today, while entire Africa is important it is the nations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) which have special significance. The east coast of Africa, the nations astride the waterways of the Middle East, the island nations such as Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka are all important because the world’s most significant sea lanes, which carry the maximum energy and container traffic, all pass through the Indian Ocean and under the shadow of the Indian peninsula.

32. The strategic location of the Andaman Islands and the Straits of Malacca give even more significance to India and its maritime capability even as the US, Japan and Australia will eventually look at the Pacific side of the Straits of Malacca. Whatever be by the Chair for Strategic Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace observations India’s relevance to the US, Japan, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia will always remain very high. 33. Almost every discussion on India’s strategic affairs ends with the analysis of its maritime power, and the aspirations towards that. To achieve anything meaningful India will need to balance its defence expenditure between the continental domain of the northern borders and the maritime domain of the Indian Ocean. The debate should be well past us and decisions in favour of the maritime zone need to be cemented.

Internal Security
34. This is a domain which needs a detailed discussion and it would be sacrilege to dismiss it perfunctorily. It is being included to remind that India’s security unless internally secure and stable the legendary ‘half front’ will always be on offer to the adversaries.

General Diplomacy
35. Some key aspects in the diplomatic domain need to be factored into the furtherance of India’s rise. Some self-explanatory conceptual ideas are :-

• The main cadre of the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) is too small to manage Indian foreign policy interests and its second rungsecretarial service is not of the required quality. There is a tearingneed for more human resources in the domain of diplomacy. Inthe interim they can be from any service with proper selectionstandards being applied.
• A system of special envoys could be incorporated for priority areas and clusters of nations / regions.
• India should promote the Global South and champion it. Over the last three decades, Indian diplomacy’s focus has beenon reordering its great power relations, bringing stability to theneighbourhood and developing regional institutions in theextended neighbourhood. Global South is significant becauseof its large population, rich cultures, and abundant naturalresources.
• Understanding the Global South is important for addressing global issues such as poverty, inequality, and climate change. All this will give India exceptional outreach and enough support to sit at the high table of developed nations.
• The true potential of India’s soft power has yet to be projected although many efforts are being made. Indian missions abroad need more knowledge and talent empowerment in this field with culture being one of the most important tools. Knowledge and culture should ultimately be the vehicles of India’s soft power.
• Military diplomacy reinforces political diplomacy and should be enhanced through consultation with the Armed Forces. There are numerous training exercises being conducted with different countries commencing from the first days of Exercise Malabar by the Indian Navy in 1991 and Exercise Yudh Abhyas with the US Army, now into its 19th year. There has also been a proliferation of such joint training with a large number of countries. The joint training footprint with the Global South will ensure further networking and international support
• Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) is a domain in which India has gained much reputation. External deployment in Nepal (2015) and the recent assistance to Turkiye and Syria (2023) have gone down well with the international community. There is enough scope for earmarking a full National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) unit only for external Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). A Naval brick of relief material must be kept in readiness for loading in a flotilla should the need arise for one.