INDIA’S STRATEGIC OPTIONS IN THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Introduction


The Backdrop and the Buildup to the War
1. The phenomena of balance of power and the world order involves interplay of nations and groups of nations in the four major conflict zones of the world. These are Europe, West Asia, South East and East Asia, and South Asia. The quest of the US, post the end of the Cold War, was invariably focused on containing the potential rise of China; that rise had been enabled through the Seventies, only to see the latter emerge as the chief competitor for domination of the world competing to be both the largest economy and the strongest military power. Through the Nineties and the early part of the millennium the US continued economic engagement for a mutually beneficial relationship with China but with preparatory steps to simultaneously engage South East Asia and South Asia, then called Asia Pacific (now known as Indo Pacific).

2. In recent years after the Cold War the US has often been forced into situations to maintain its dominance and retain the balance of power in its favour through various actions. Withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 was a necessity if it wished to focus on the rise of China taking place in the Indo Pacific region. Similarly, for many years through the Obama Administration attempts were being made to reduce US presence in West Asia and make the region more stable by making conflicts there less strategically relevant. The reduction of dependence on West Asian energy, bringing Saudi Arabia out of its brooding radicalism and lowering the stakes in the Israel-Palestinian conflict were some of the methods it adopted. With President Trump it was the Abraham Accords which set the pace of stabilizing West Asia. Israel marginalized the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas and empowered Hamas which professed to be working towards the development of the Palestinian people. Israel even overlooked financial support from Qatar to Hamas and the fact that the Hamas leadership lived in Qatar and ran the show from there, out of reach and out of sight.

3. Surya Foundation Think Tank comprising domain experts carried out an in depth study of the “What the Hamas Israel War means to the World and to India”. Their analysis and suggestions are given in the succeeding paras.

ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Abraham Accords – the Essentials
4. For the US this was the way to stabilize civilizational discord in the heartland of faiths, attempt to leave a legacy of stability in the Middle East, and focus against the main adversary, China. It is a strategic front against Iran, Turkey and other radically oriented nations to stabilize a crucial region through convergence of interests of the Middle East nations – a world beyond energy; with more emphasis on trade, technology, cyber and tourism.

Perception of Hamas
5. Hamas was fully conscious that the US focus on West Asia was waning and that it was more interested in settling/stabilizing the region in order to shift attention to the Indo Pacific. It also realized that if the US achieved all the objectives of getting a rapprochement between the Arab nations and Israel, the Palestinian people would be left high and dry with the ‘one state’ policy firmly in place. The ‘one state’ would be Israel with Palestinians as subjects within, with few rights. The Hamas leadership was inspired by Anwar Sadat’s conflict initiation of Oct 1973 when two Egyptian Armies crossed the Suez Canal in broad daylight to surprise the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), and advanced ten kilometres into the Sinai desert to apparently draw the attention of the world towards the then fading attention from West Asia and to get the US and other big powers back to engage and find a solution to the problem.

Conflict Initiation
6. In Oct 2023 Hamas chose to initiate the conflict with a surprise attack in South Israel across the Gaza fence taking the IDF and Israeli civil society completely by surprise. A well-rehearsed and coordinated operation using unconventional ways of targeting, with no concern for civilian casualties or the number of hostages that Hamas took from different countries. The depravity in the actions displayed mirrored the ISIS doctrine and was designed to bring a response of hatred. Hamas engaged population centres with a huge quantity of missiles (as many as 5000). Israel responded with a vengeance but through air power. A ‘War of Unequals’ with willingness to lose militarily and sacrifice lives for the sake of sparking an international crisis appears to be the intent of Hamas. It will fight tooth and nail to cause maximum attrition with the knowledge that Israel cannot accept heavy casualties and its response overkill will ultimately work against it in the stakes involving international opinion.

Israel’s Response Strategy
7. Israel overcame initial intelligence failure with a massive bombing response to target Hamas leadership with precision munitions and with no remorse about collateral damage or casualties, conducted Special Forces operations for specific command & control centres. It mobilized 3,50,000 troops, re-organized IDF to cater for the Hezbollah front and aimed at early release of hostages through acceptance of temporary ceasefire. A second ceasefire could be on the cards but Hamas is likely to move the last of the hostages to a safe haven to elongate the war. Israel squeezed the Palestinian population to restricted areas in Gaza with limited humanitarian support.

8. There was an initial hesitation to commence the ground offensive into Gaza. However, this can be ascribed to delay in mobilization and formation of combat units. Once the offensive commenced rapid progress was made and much of the tunnel infrastructure has been destroyed. However, the last Hamas operative may prove to be elusive and around him the next resistance will probably be formed to bring the Middle East to an unending spiral of war.

9. The Indian Armed Forces must hasten to determine the lessons from the ongoing IDF campaign particularly in the domains of intelligence, AI, drones, urban conventional warfare, network centricity, psychological warfare and the higher direction of war.

The Failure of the Israeli Intelligence System
10. The best of intelligence systems can collapse. The IDF first experienced this in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War; the resultant inquiry had corrected almost all faults. Over time it went rusty depending entirely on technical intelligence and incorporating little human interface and sourcing. The fence was covered by unmanned automatic firing systems which could be effectively neutralized.

11. A level of hubris had also set in, in the IDF. National attention was diverted by the political shenanigans of Benjamin Netanyahu who was trying to alter the national justice system to escape some penalties due to proven corruption.

12. A simple lesson in this is that national political, ideological and sociological challenges must never be allowed to come in the way of the national intelligence system.

About the War
13. The Hamas initiation of conflict throws up interesting issues which need careful analysis to get the right measure of the gravity of this war.
a) Initiation of violence by Hamas was not inevitable. It was triggered by deep and long-lasting frustrations among the Palestinian people in Gaza, the West Bank, and the world beyond. This is something which can always happen within a segment of people when frustration and negativity set in. It needs careful monitoring.
b) The war ceases many ongoing initiatives and arrangements for the stabilization and progress of West Asia.
c) The expected pro Palestine sentiment among Arab states has not risen and most of these states prefer to remain neutral depending which side prospers militarily.
d) Surprisingly, the high decibel support for the Jewish community, traditionally existent in the US and West Europe, has shifted in favour of support to the Palestinians. These trends need better understanding.
e) There is no end in sight for the war and the status of victory is difficult to determine.
f) There are no solutions on offer and equally no initiatives.
g) This is a hybrid war with a conventional force pitted against an organized terrorist group. Many of the principles of war apply here and many of the technologies at play will provide us and the world at large, results and information about modern weapon systems, logistics, technologies, training and much more.
h) The role of regional players, to include Iran, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia is at stake. Who takes most cognizance of the plight of civilians and helps in humanitarian assistance will no doubt have a future dominant role.
i) Is there a potential solution to the Israel-Palestinian problem? Scores of options have been pursued but the obstacles are far more complex and need identification and threadbare analysis.
j) There have been threats from Hezbollah, Iran and even Syria but none of these have translated into anything serious. They help in keeping the IDF engaged on multiple fronts.
k) The assessed quantity of 1,30,000 missiles and rockets in the hands of Hamas and Hezbollah has not been employed in mass assault probably for fear of retaliation on Gaza but remains a threat in being.
l) A hostage situation continues to persist with an undetermined number of hostages in the hands of Hamas who have been moved from city to city in Gaza strip. A cease fire without their release is not even fathomable.
m) Israel’s reaction was on expected lines. Initially it was to cater for the sentiment of being surprised; this was an ego shattering phenomenon. Israel has done well in terms of war fighting in neutralizing the hideouts of Hamas but the number of civilian casualties as collateral is an unacceptable phenomenon for the world.
n) It is unclear whether international humanitarian law applies to a population on whose behalf a set of renegade terrorists are fighting without any qualms about taking hostages or operating from behind civilian targets.

Geopolitical Issues
14. This war suits international and regional players and its post war rejig will have a profound effect on the region and the world.

15. There are geopolitical issues at stake, on the future configuration of the region.

16. The US policy pursuance of stability of West Asia through measures such as Abraham Accords was essentially flawed, as these did not take along the aspirations of the Palestinians.

17. A more cogent strategy at ending the conflict on its terms will have to be thought through if Israel wishes to see even a modicum of peace hereafter.

18. While India supported the US policy of stabilization of West Asia our interests will be affected by the setbacks received to the Abraham Accords, India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States (I2U2), India Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC), and Israel-Saudi Arabia rapprochement.

19. Clearly, no appetite exists for a larger war among all leaderships in the region and those of the big powers. The war may have only a limited impact internationally but will continue to provide instability now and in the foreseeable future.

20. The US wants to promote a new order in West Asia, marked by the Abraham Accords, I2U2, IMEEC, and Israel-Saudi Arabia rapprochement. None of this is going to be achievable while the situation remains fluid.

21. Ukraine. Kyiv is already suffering from an attention deficit. A progressive decline in assistance to Ukraine by the US and Europe seems inevitable. Hence, Russia is likely to be the gainer.

22. The war in West Asia is almost like a competing event, for the focus of the US with Ukraine and Indo Pacific having to languish for a bit.

23. Of the four possible scenarios – one-state solution, tri-lateralization, two-state solution, and the status quo – the two-state solution is what the international community must work for. Without it there is unlikely to be peace.

24. As a potential leader of the Global South India’s needs to be vociferous on issues such as human rights, humanitarian aid and adherence to the rules of war as laid down by various international instruments. However, its geopolitical interest lies in being against terrorism and in favour of a pro-US, pro-Israel policy line in keeping with the dynamics of the emerging international order. Reconciliation of India’s deep belief in the imperatives of justice for the Palestinian people and long-standing support for the two-state solution, with the US-Israel stance is going to remain a challenge. We have done well so far but greater intellectual investigation by leading geopolitical experts will place India under pressure.

Ten Takeaways for India
25. The massive intelligence failure by Israel on 7 Oct 2023 preceded by the huge failure of the world to predict the Ukraine War on 2022 should be lessons at the strategic level that intelligence-based predictions continue to remain a challenge with technology unable to provide the required direction. India must guard against this and train our agencies to sharpen their assessment. Inputs are usually available, it’s the assessment which lags. Humint and techint need to be balanced on the assessment desk.

26. The war has provided a trigger to radical elements on the potential of engaging a superior conventional force in hybrid war. The willingness to sacrifice own populations for a potential cause is a new phenomenon. Our assessments about hybrid situations in India do not take this into consideration.

27. A resurgence of global terror could well be on the cards due to the motivation received from the sacrifice of Hamas. Our neighbourhood is in ferment with the return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. A deeper study of this on J&K is necessary.

28. The war is slowly moving away from headlines and even from the back pages of print media. Even with 19000 dead in Gaza the world is willing to ignore the situation. With elections in the US in the offing the ability to influence Israel’s decisions is already compromised.

29. None of the Arab countries are likely to go beyond lip service on the issue of support for Hamas. At the same time a victory for Israel is highly unlikely. The status of the Ukraine war could well extend here too; a stalemate. Iran has been vociferous in support but has limited itself in every way.

30. The expansion of hostilities and tension can emerge if the displaced Palestinians are forced into Egyptian or Jordanian territories to prevent the use of Gaza as the launch pad. The longest lasting peace between former adversaries Egypt and Israel, could go up in holy smoke. It can also happen if Hezbollah decides to target northern Israel.

31. The war is unlikely to cause tensions in the Gulf region and India must continue to work on maintaining its strong traditional relationships with all these countries. Pakistan could attempt to use the opportunity to run down India’s balanced approach to West Asia. Our diplomacy must be proactive and anticipatory about potential moves from Pakistan.

32. The possibility of a Hamas-type attack on border populations in India remains a possibility, especially since Pakistani terror groups are known to copy operational techniques of different terror groups. Border guarding forces must be vigilant both from intelligence and response point of you. As an example, for a case study, the Jammu to Pathankot segment of the international border offers the best scenario. This is a high intensity hybrid war which must be adopted if required even by our forces if instigated.

33. The Indian Armed Forces must analyse the war as it progresses and do an equipment study to determine which weapons and technology systems succeed in the type of terrain which presents itself in Gaza.

34. Hubris is the last thing a nation can ever live with whatsoever its success. India too has had some spectacular success in our strategic security related issues. This should not allow any over confidence. Every adversary has to be treated as possessing a high level of intellect, readiness and intent.